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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

WESLEY CLOCK AND
ANNE CLOCK,

)

APPELLEE'S BRIEF

Plaintiffs/Appellees,
I

Case No. 960797-CA

>

Priority No. 15

vs.
JOHN F. GREEN AND
LARUE GREEN,

Defendants/Appellants,

)

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This appeal is from a final judgment entered pursuant to
appellees' motion for summary judgment. The final judgment
denied

appellants'

counter-motion

for

summary

judgment.

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah, this case was poured-over

to the Court

of

Appeals

jurisdiction

to

for

disposition.

This

Court

has

adjudicate the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §§ 782-2(3)(j) and 78-2-2(4) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL
Does the subject lease agreement sufficiently describe
the

option

to

purchase

without

the

need

for

extrinsic

evidence?
The appellees adopt the standard of review set forth in
appellants' brief.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Rule 56(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
...The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers
to i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s ,
and
admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law...
U.C.A., §25-5-3:
Every contract for the leasing for a
longer period than one year, or for the
sale, of any lands, or any interest in
lands, shall be void unless the contract,
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in
writing subscribed by the party by whom
the lease or sale is to be made, or by
his lawful agent thereunto authorized in
writing.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is an appeal by John F.

Green and Larue G

reen ("Greens") from a final judgment entered pursuant to a
motion for summary judgment by Wesley Clock and Anne Clock
2

("Clocks"). The Greens made a counter-motion
judgment.

for summary

The lower court, after hearing the arguments of

counsel, entered an order and judgment granting the Clocks'
motion for summary judgment and denying the Greens' countermotion for summary judgment. A copy of the order and judgment
is attached to appellants' brief as Appendix "B". The order
and judgment determined that the Greens must convey property
at 1324 East 5485 South, Salt Lake City, Utah to the Clocks
upon

receipt

of

the

balance

of

the

purchase

price

of

$76,500.00. It was also ordered that any payments made by the
Clocks to the Greens for rent after August 4, 1996 be applied
against the balance of the purchase price.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The

Clocks

and

Greens

entered

into

a

rental

arrangement for property at 1324 East 5485 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah.

The parties understood and agreed that the

property to be rented was at the said address. R. 1, 2, 12,
13, 19, & 33.
2.

In

connection

with

the rental

arrangement, the

Clocks insisted that the Greens provide them with an option
to purchase the property. R. 19.
3.

The Greens prepared a hand written agreement for

rent and for an option to purchase:
3

I Wesley Clock and Anne Clock agree to
pay $675.00 per month plus sewer and
water. There is a $350 deposit plus a
$1,000 for lease option to buy. Starting
July 29, 1991 pro-rated to Aug. 4, 1991.
The selling price to be $81,500 at 10 H
% interest. When option is picked up, the
$350 plus the $1,000 will be applied to
the down payment of $5,000 or more. The
Seller will re-roof and make the carport
into a double garage. Replace the back
door. Other than the things above, the
Clocks will take care of any repairs
during this option period. There will be
a balloon payment due on the balance of
the loan Aug. 5, 1996. The rent to be
prorated from July 29, 1991 to Aug. 4',
1991. Rent to begin on Aug. 5, 1991.
August 2 is $500; August 5 is $700;
balance by Aug. 20, 1991. If the Clocks
do not buy they will be renters and money
will not be refunded. (Attached hereto as
Appendix "A") R. 5, 20, & 33.
4.

The

Clocks

paid

the

$350.00

deposit

and

the

$1,000.00 lease option amount to the Greens at the time of
the execution of the agreement. The Greens accepted said
payments. R. 2 & 20.
5.

The Greens did not give a notice of the termination

of the option to purchase until after the Clocks gave a
notice of an intent to exercise the option on April 12, 1996.
(A copy of the notice of intent to exercise the option is
attached hereto as Appendix "B") R. 7, 13, 20.
6.

The Greens have refused to sell the property at

1324 East 5485 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, to the Clocks for
4

the option price of $81,500.00. R. 13, 20, & 21.
7.
tendered

The

Clocks,

$3,650.00

to

in

connection

the

court

as

with
the

this

balance

action,
of

the

$5,000.00 down payment called for in the option. R. 21 & 28.
8.

The appellees dispute the appellants' statement of

facts in the following respects:
a.

While

the

contract

does

not

specify

the

address of the property, there has never been a dispute
as to the location of the property. R. 1, 2, 12, 13, 19,
Sc 3 3 .

b.

The

agreement,

by

its

reasonable

interpretation, provides an option period to August 5,
1996. R. 5, 20 & 23.
c.

While there is a factual dispute on parole

statements

at

the

time

of

the

execution

of

the

agreement, the agreement is silent as to the subject of
said parole allegations. R. 5, 20 & 23.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The agreement is sufficiently clear on the terms of

the option to purchase.

Therefore, the parole evidence rule

would exclude evidence of additional terms to those in the
agreement,

including

contemporaneous

5

conversations,

statements, or representations offered for the purpose of
varying or adding to the terms of the contract.
2.

When a lease includes an option to purchase, the

term of the option is appropriately interpreted to be the
termination date of the lease unless another option period is
specified within the lease itself. In keeping with the
purpose of the Statute of Frauds under U.C.A. §25-5-3, a
court should not impose a condition on an option which is not
contained within the writing so long as the option can be
interpreted without parole evidence.
3.

Any ambiguity in the written agreement should be

resolved in favor of the Clocks, since the Greens drafted the
agreement.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE AGREEMENT IS SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR TO
ESTABLISH THE TERMS OF THE OPTION.
It is incumbent upon an optionor and an optionee to act
fairly and in good faith to fulfill their obligation to each
other in connection with an option agreement.

Nielson v.

Droubay, 652 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1983). The Greens are not acting
fairly in this case. Our option states that "The selling
price to be $81,500.00 at 10^ % interest... There will be a

6

balloon payment due on the balance of the loan August 5,
1996." The Greens refuse to allow the Clocks to purchase the
property for $81,500.00 even though the agreement contains no
deadline for the exercise of the option. By the language of
the agreement, the option price could have been paid at any
time prior to August

5, 1996. The Greens, even if they

intended a shorter option period, never gave any notice of a
termination of the option.

Also no option exercise deadline

is included within the written agreement. R. 7, 13 & 20.
The appellants, have raised the argument for the first
time in this appeal that the agreement does not contain the
address of the property. However, this has never been an
issue before. The complaint alleged the property address and
the defendants' answer admitted the same. R.

1, 2, 12, & 13.

The Clocks rented this property and have been living there
ever

since the date

of the agreement.

Therefore, this

omission from the agreement should not operate to avoid the
parole evidence

rule regarding

the option.

"The parole

evidence rule as a principal of contract interpretation has
a very narrow application. Simply stated, the rule operates
in

the

absence

of

fraud

to

exclude

contemporaneous

conversations, statements, or representations offered for the
purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an integrated
7

contract." Union Bank v. Swenson. 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985).
This

Court

stated

the

following

in

Webb

v.

R.O.A.

General, Inc., 804 P.2d 547 (Utah Appellant 1991):
If an agreement is integrated, the parole
evidence rule excludes evidence of terms
in addition to those in the agreement,
thus
excluding
"^conte mp oraneous
conversations,
statements,
or
representation offered for the purpose of
varying or adding to the terms of an
integrated contract'" Colonial Leasing
Co. v.
Larsen Bros. Const. r 731 P.2d
483, 486 (Utah 1986) [quoting Union Bank
v.
Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665
(Utah
1985)] . A nonintegrated contract may
exist where the terms are not ambiguous,
but the nature of the agreement itself is
unclear. Id. "Only when contract terms
are complete, clear and unambiguous can
they be interpreted by the judge on a
motion for summary judgment." Id.
at
488.
In our case, the terms regarding the option are both clear
and non-ambiguous.

The purchase price is set.

The date when

the purchase price must be finally paid is also set.
agreement

Our

is silent as to the down payment date and the

period of the option.

The law does not require that those

terms be included in an option in order for an agreement to
be integrated.

In other words, a down payment date and an

option period are not necessary terms for the existence of an
option.

The Webb case confirms this principal by stating

that "Courts are not obligated to rewrite contracts entered
8

into by parties dealing at arm's length, to relieve one party
from a bargain later regretted, simply on supposed equitable
principles. Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657
P. 2d 743, 749
regret

the

(Utah 1982)." Id^_ at 551." The Greens now

deal

because

they

could

apparently

sell

the

property for more than they had promised to sell it to the
Clocks

for.

integrated

This

does

contract

not

terms

justify
for

excuses

to

beyond

the

rewrite

the

\

agreement.
It

looking

is

acknowledged

that

the

contract

bears

little

resemblance to one drafted by an attorney. It is not artfully
or well written. However, this does not mean that extrinsic
evidence

should

be

sought

to add to the agreement. The

agreement is sufficiently clear to stand on its own with
respect to the option.
II.
AS A LEASE OPTION ON REAL PROPERTY,
THE AGREEMENT IS ENFORCEABLE BECAUSE
IT CONTAINS A PURCHASE PRICE AND A DATE
WHEN THE FULL PURCHASE MUST BE PAID.
The agreement in questions specifies a purchase price of
$81,500.00. It also contains the date when the purchase price
must be fully paid - August 5, 1996. The Utah Supreme Court
has upheld options which contain just such information. In

9

the case of Hoffman v. Sullivan. 599 P.2d 505, (Utah 1979),
the Court stated:
The trial court's finding that there was
ambiguity in the option provision because
there was "no provision... made as to how
and when payments would be made" is
unsupportable.
The option price was
fixed and as to that there was no
dispute.
In general, such a provision
calls for a payment of cash at the time
of the exercise of the option, hence, as
a matter of law, there was no ambiguity
as to how and when payments would be
made.
Just recently this court sustained
a contract which was more ambiguous than
the pertinent provision in the instant
contract (Citation omitted) [t]his court
affirmed this enforceability of a
contract in which the only term fixed was
the purchase price.
Our agreement fixes the option

price, the date when the

full purchase price must be completed, the amount of the
option price and the deposit to be applied

to the down

payment. There need be no deadline date for the making of the
down payment nor a termination date on the option earlier
than August 5, 1996.

The Washington Appellate Court dealt

with a question similar to that of this case. In the case of
Beaudry v. Harman.

626 P.2d 50 (28 Wash. App. 719) (Wash.

App. 1981), an option included within the lease did not have
a

termination

date.

The

Court

ruled

that

absent

a

termination date for an option within a lease agreement, the
10

option will expire upon
case,

the termination of the lease. In our

the agreement has no termination date on the option

and no down payment date for the exercise of the option.
Therefore, the option
August 5, 1996.

should be considered

A notice of intent

was given on April 12, 1996.

to expire on

to exercise the option

The exercise of the option was

adequate and timely.

The refusal by the Greens to sell the

property either by

contract or by cash payoff prior to

August 5, 1996 was in breach of the agreement they drafted.
The Statute of Frauds at U.C.A. §25-5-3 requires matters
involving

real property

to be

set

forth

in writing.

In

keeping with the purpose of this statute, matters involving
an option to purchase real property should be governed by the
written document wherever possible, without
extrinsic evidence.

resorting

to

The trial judge appropriately reviewed

the agreement and the record in accordance with Rule 56(c),
U.R.C.P.

It was determined that the option was sufficiently

clear

order

to

the

sale.

The

alleged

factual

dispute

regarding an earlier oral termination of the option did not
need to be addressed because the written agreement already
addressed the necessary terms of an option to purchase real
property.

11

III.
THE LANGUAGE OF THE CONTRACT SHOULD
BE CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF THE CLOCKS.
In 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts §347, 348, it states:
It is also said that an instrument
uncertain as to its terms is to be most
strongly construed against the party
thereto who causes such uncertainty to
exist, especially if he is the party who
drew the contract or selected its
language... It is fundamental that
doubtful language in a contract should be
interpreted most strongly against the
party who has selected that language,
especially where he seeks to use such
language to defeat the contract or its
operation, unless the
use of such
language in the contract is prescribed by
law...As corollary to the above rule, a
contract drawn by one party must be
construed, if its meaning is doubtful, in
favor of the non-drafting party.
The Greens are now attempting to use extrinsic evidence to
defeat the operation of the option they wrote.
that the agreement is clear on its face.

Clocks allege

Yet, even if it is

considered uncertain in any respect, it should be construed
against the Greens.

By using reasonable construction of the

contract, this Court need not go outside the express terms of
the agreement to determine that the option could be exercised
at any time before August 5, 1996.

12

CONCLUSION
The Greens drafted a rental agreement which includes all
the necessary terms for

an option to purchase.

price is established by the option.

The option

The date for the final

payment of the purchase price is provided in the option.
Also, the amount of the down payment is set forth in the
agreement.

The Clocks gave a notice of intent to exercise

the option and paid the down payment prior to August 5, 1996.
Yet, the Greens have refused to sell under the terms of the
agreement they drafted.

This is simply a breach of contract.

The decision of the lower court should be affirmed and the
Greens should be required to sell the property as agreed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/ ^ d a y of April, 1997.

BRYAlfw. CANNON
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby declare that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid,

three

following on the.

(3) copies

of Appellee's

Brief

of April, 1997:

David L. Grindstaff
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
457 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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APPENDIX "A"

/
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Wesley & Anne Clock
1324 E 5985 S
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

April 10, 1996

John F. Green
9769 S. Tayside Drive
South Jordan, Utah 84095-9730
Re:

Notification to Purchase
1324 E 5985 S
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

This letter is inform you that in accordance with the copy of the attached agreement, we
have applied for a morgage loan to purchase the property referenced.
Sincerely,

Wesley & Anne Clock

APPENDIX "B"

